How Transglot is secured.
scoped.
How Transglot is secured.
Encryption, access control, tenant isolation and the audit trail, each one naming the mechanism that enforces it. The things we have not built are written down here as gaps.
- tls 1.2 or better in transit
- hmac-signed webhooks
- append-only audit rows
- four roles, five token abilities
Encryption, access, isolation and audit.
Encrypted before it leaves the host
Database backups are encrypted on the way out. The file backup repository is password-encrypted and refuses to run without its key. Connected-app credentials and webhook secrets are stored as encrypted columns. Deploy tokens are stored as a SHA-256 hash and shown once, at creation. The live disks are not encrypted at the volume level, because we have not built that, and you should learn it here rather than in diligence.
Signed on the way out
Outbound webhooks are signed with HMAC-SHA256 over the timestamp and the body. The timestamp is sent too, so you can enforce your own replay window.
Identity and access
Four roles on every plan, Free included: owner, admin, developer and translator. Per-project and per-language grants sit on top, so a freelancer can be given one language and see nothing else. SAML 2.0 sign-in with just-in-time provisioning and SCIM 2.0 provisioning ship on Enterprise, and password login can be switched off for the whole organization.
Tenant isolation
Every query is scoped to your organization and project. An id belonging to somebody else answers 404 rather than 403, so the existence of another workspace never leaks. The shared exact-match memory pool is the one deliberate exception, and any project can leave it with a switch.
The audit trail
Role changes, token creation, billing changes, SSO configuration and SSO sign-ins are recorded, and the rows cannot be edited or deleted: the model throws on both. Password sign-ins are not in the trail today. Owners and admins on Enterprise export the whole trail as CSV. There is no hash chain and no cryptographic signature, so nothing here says tamper-evident.
Uptime and credits
We publish no percentage here, because any figure we typed would be our word for our own availability. Business and Enterprise carry a contractual monthly uptime target with a service-credit schedule, and that schedule is the SLA.
Where compliance actually stands
The same four rows the trust page and the trust center read, from the same config. A stamp can only say "held" when a boolean says so, and today none of them does.
- SOC 2 Type II: audit in progress
- ISO/IEC 42001 (AI management): pursuing
- GDPR: aligned, not certified
- CCPA / CPRA: aligned, not certified
What a reviewer asks, answered first.
The questions a security review opens with, and the answers, in the order they usually arrive. Every line is a control in the codebase rather than a claim about one. The last line is a gap, and it stays here until it stops being true.
- no findings quoted, because there is no third-party report yet
- no certification implied: the compliance table on /trust reads from config
- good-faith research is never met with lawyers
FAQs
The list a security review usually arrives with.